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1
Do Banks Monitor Corporate Decisions? Evidence from Bank Financing of
Mergers and Acquisitions
Abstract
We examine whether banks, in providing financing for the deals, monitor firms
mergers and acquisitions to the extent that will benefit acquirers shareholders. Incon-
sistent with the conventional theoretical argument, we do not find that bank-financed
deals are associated with better stock or accounting performance than bond-financed
deals or deals paid with internal cash. There is strong evidence instead that banks
tighten up the loan contract terms in financing the deals, such as cutting short the loan
maturity and imposing higher collateral requirement and more covenant restrictions.
However, bank-financed deals are more likely to be terminated when they experience
more negative stock market reactions to deal announcements, suggesting that banks
may be subject to the pressure of shareholder dissent. Overall, our results suggest
that banks do not monitor to enhance firm value but rather protect themselves from
downside risks through more stringent loan contract terms. This study highlights the
passive role of banks in corporate decisions outside of credit default states and covenant
violations.
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1 Introduction
Theories have long suggested that banks screen/monitor borrowers, which certifies/enhances
borrowers value (e.g. Diamond, 1984; Ramakrishnan and Thakor, 1984). Existing empirical
evidence that is usually suggested as being supportive of the above argument is that stock
prices of borrowers respond favorably when borrowers announce bank loans (e.g. James,
1987; Billett et al., 1995) and unfavorably on the news of the failure of relationship banks
(e.g. Slovin et al., 1993). Yet, a more recent event study by Maskara and Mullineaux (2011)
calls into question the specialness of banks based on a larger sample and argues that firms
would only announce loans that are likely to generate positive announcement returns. More-
over, the positive (negative) market response to loans announced (relationship bank failure)
may capture benefits, which we will discuss in Section 2, other than monitoring/certification
by banks. On the other hand, there is also lack of more direct evidence that banks monitor
corporate decisions to the extent that enhances the firm value. This paper attempts to fill
this gap in the literature.
Specifically, we examine whether banks, while providing financing for firms mergers and
acquisitions (M&As), monitor this corporate decision and add value for acquiring borrowers.
Focusing on M&As has several advantages. First, M&As are one of the most important
decisions that firms make. There is a large literature that documents that M&As often
create zero or even negative value for acquiring firms. Thus, if banks monitoring were to
add value to shareholders, then M&As would be one where the scope for adding value is
quite high. Second, an important limitation with the loan announcement studies is that it
is often difficult to identify the loan announcement dates1. In contrast, we have a relatively
comprehensive sample of M&As where announcement is required due to regulatory reasons.
1This is why even the relatively large sample event study by Maskara and Mullineaux (2011) uses around
1000 observations which is significantly smaller than the universe of loans in the LPC Dealscan data set.
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Third, by linking the returns to the acquiring firms to the resulting contract terms of loans
used to finance the deals, we can discern more sharply banks incentives in providing the
loans.
The hypotheses we test are three fold. First, going by earlier results in the literature,
bank financing should add value, as banks can monitor and potentially block value reducing
acquisitions by withholding financing. Thus, acquisitions financed by banks should have
more positive value implication for shareholders, which may arise either due to the certifi-
cation benefits that a bank is willing to finance the deal, or due to potential monitoring of
the management to keep value-reducing deals that are motivated by private benefits from
occurring. We refer to this hypothesis as the bank monitoring hypothesis.
Second, banks may substitute for due diligence and monitoring by changing the loan
contract terms. In particular, Manove et al. (2001) presents a model of lazy banks where
banks may substitute monitoring by increasing covenants and collateral whereby they are
protected from downside risk. In this case, banks should not be associated with any positive
value creation for acquiring firm shareholders. Rather, one should observe loan contract
terms to be significantly different for bank loans that finance acquisitions relative to other
banks loans. Henceforth, we refer to this as the lazy bank hypothesis.
Third, the interests of equity holders and debt holders are understandably not always
aligned. The equity-debt conflict of interest suggests that banks may refrain from financing
deals that are risky but value-enhancing for equity holders. Also, to the extent that concur-
rent lending may lead to more current and future businesses (e.g. Drucker and Puri, 2005),
this may further incentivize them to provide financing even if they perceive the M&As as
value reducing from the shareholders perspective. We refer to this as the conflict of interest
hypothesis.
Note that these hypotheses are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Banks could be mon-
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itoring in ways that increase the value for shareholders, but at the same time, also changing
loan contract terms in a way that protect themselves from downside risks. Ultimately, it is
an empirical question as to which or all of these hypotheses has an economically important
effect. The empirical prediction by all three hypotheses are summarized in table 1.
To test these hypotheses, we obtain a sample of 2709 M&As from the SDC database where
the method of payment involves at least some cash payment (thus we exclude all stock deals)
for the period 1990-2009. We need this restriction as bank financing would be relevant only
if the acquiring firm requires cash financing. Using the LPC Dealscan database, we identify
all loans taken by an acquiring firm from one year prior to the deal announcement to the
deal completion date as being used to finance the M&A2. Accordingly, we define 563 deals
as being bank financed, and the remaining 2146 deals as being non-bank financed (financed
with internal cash or/and bond issuance).
Our main findings are as follows. First, relative to all non-bank financed deals as well as
bond financed deals, bank financed deals do not experience higher abnormal stock returns
both upon the deal announcement and over the next three years. Meanwhile, the acquir-
ing firms do not have better operating performance in bank financed deals. The results
are robust to banks reputation and prior relationship with acquirers. Also, the results hold
among firms that are small, have no (or low) credit ratings, and are financially constrained,
where the scope of bank monitoring is supposed to be greater. Second, loans made for ac-
quisition financing receive significantly more stringent contract terms, compared to all other
loans in Dealscan or loans made one year earlier for non-acquisition purposes to the same
firms. Specifically, while acquisition-related loans have the similar yield spreads, they have
2Alternative definitions have been used in identifying whether an acquisition is bank financed, e.g., loans
obtained from one year before the deal announcement to the deal announcement, or loans with the reported
purpose in Dealscan being that they are made to finance acquisitions. Our results are not sensitive to these
alternative definitions.
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significantly short maturities, are more likely to require collaterals, and have more covenants
attached. Third, while bank financed deals are more likely to be completed uncondition-
ally, they are more likely to be terminated when they experience more negative stock price
reactions to the deal announcements.
Our findings suggest that, in the context of M&As outside of credit default states and
covenant violations, banks may not screen or monitor the deals to the extent that share-
holders of borrowers can free ride on banks due diligence3. Rather, banks appear to engage
in business generation through acquisition financing and protect themselves from potential
post-M&A credit risks. Given that bank financed deals are not fared worse either, our re-
sults seem to be more consistent with the lazy bank hypothesis than the conflict of interest
hypothesis. However, the evidence also implies that banks are subject to the pressure of
shareholder dissent in financing M&As, which suggests an interesting interaction between
creditors and shareholders in corporate governance.
We further examine the robustness of our interpretation of the results. First, banks
might have screened or monitored through private communication with management before
M&As are announced, and as a result, may have prevented firms from even embarking on
acquisitions that could result in a large destruction of value by refrain from financing the
deals. Thus, deals with great value destruction would not occur and thus are not observed.
If it were the case, however, it should have biased against us finding the results, because
we should expect that bank financed deals on average are better deals than those otherwise
similar but not financed by banks.
Second, one may argue that M&As are such a corporate setting where interest conflict
between creditors and shareholders is likely severe. Being aware of this, banks may choose
3Empirically it is difficult to distinguish between bank screening and monitoring, as the implications on
the deal outcome are the same. Thus, throughout the paper, we refer to bank screening/monitoring as
monitoring.
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to finance only less risky (and mediocre)M&As, which can explain the lack of superior stock
performance. We conduct two checks to address this issue. (i) We first examine whether
acquirers are diversifying into different industries through the acquisitions, which may be
favored by banks. We find that about 40 percent of bank financed M&As are diversifying
deals, a proportion similar to that for non-bank financed M&As. Moreover, even among those
non-diversifying deals, bank financed ones do not outperform. (ii) We then investigate how
bank financed deals perform in a subsample of financially distressed firms, where the interests
of creditors and shareholders are likely the most aligned. We do not find outperformance by
bank financed deals either. Overall, the lack of evidence on bank monitoring is unlikely to
be driven by our selection of the corporate setting M&As in examining this issue. Further,
conflict of interest alone cannot explain our findings.
Third, if banks do not specifically avert financing risky deals as shown above, one might
be concerned that the more stringent loan contracts simply reflect higher credit risks that
banks embrace due to the risk-taking incentives by equity holders. We compare the likelihood
of a credit event occurred to the combined firms in the three years subsequent to the M&As,
and find that bank financed deals are not more likely to observe a credit event during the
examined period. Therefore, the stringent contract terms are not likely to be due to higher
credit risks associated with the financed deals. It further strengthens the support for the
lazy bank hypothesis.
Lastly, the choice of bank financing is not exogenous. The pecking order theory suggests
that only cash-constrained firms may use bank loans to finance acquisitions. But such an
endogeneity concern should have biased against us finding that bank financed deals are not
better than other cash deals. This is because cash-rich firms are more likely to engage in
acquisitions motivated by agency issues (e.g. Harford, 1999) and thus bank financed deals
should be more likely to be value increasing. Nevertheless, we instrument the choice of bank
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financing and find that our results continue to hold. The instruments we use include the
distance between the acquirers and banks, whether a M&A is made during the credit bubble
period 2005-2007, and whether the acquirers have borrowing experience with banks. That
is, a firm is expected to be more likely to obtain bank financing when it is geographically
closer to banks, when the deal is made during a time of ample cheap credit, and if it has
borrowing relationship with banks before the deal.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the relation to the
literature and delineates the contribution of our study. Section 3 describes the sample and
variables used in the empirical tests. Section 4 presents our main findings. In Section 5 we
conduct robustness checks and discuss the interpretation of our results. Section 6 concludes.
2 Relation to the literature and delineation of our con-
tribution
There is a vast literature on the benefits and costs of bank lending and relationship
banking4. We do not intend to provide a complete survey here, and rather discuss some of
the studies that are most closely related. Generally, banks can reuse information collected
through multiple interactions and add value by providing other information-sensitive services.
For instance, studies such as Petersen and Rajan (1994), Berger and Udell (1995), Bharath
et al. (2011) find that borrowers with a bank relationship can have better access to future
loans.Bharath et al. (2007) document that such borrowers will also have better contract terms
on future loans. Other studies suggest that borrowers enjoy better pricing on concurrent
and future security issuances (e.g. Puri, 1996; Gande et al., 1997; Drucker and Puri, 2005).
Dass and Massa (2011) find that a strong bank relation improves the borrowers corporate
4See, for instance, Boot (2000) for a summary of the literature.
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governance.
We do not dispute the price-term and non-price-term benefits of bank lending and the
value added from bank relationship. The positive market response to loan announcements
documented in the earlier literature may well reflect the markets expectation of those ben-
efits. In our study, we provide another view of bank behavior during the financing of a
corporate activity. We find that, different from the general perception of banks active role
in certifying firm quality and monitoring managerial decisions, the market does not endorse
similarly banks role in financing M&As. The evidence strongly supports the notion of lazy
banks that they substitute loan contract terms for their screening/monitoring. Of course,
we are not to claim that banks do not do their due diligence. Banks may try to minimize
their exposure to the credit risks in their financing decisions, but our evidence suggests that
such an effort is not sufficient to benefit shareholders of the borrowers in the case of M&As.
Our study also adds to the growing literature on how creditors may exert their influence
over firm financial and investment decisions outside of bankruptcy. Most of them focus on the
impact of debt covenants and creditors control upon the violation of covenants (e.g. Chava
and Roberts, 2008; Nini et al., 2009, 2012; Roberts and Sufi, 2009). We provide evidence
of the impact of creditors on corporate decisions in normal time. Our findings suggest that
the role of creditors (apart from providing financing) before payment defaults and covenant
violations is rather limited, inconsistent with the theoretical argument. The exception is
that banks may have firms terminate the acquisitions in the presence of great shareholder
dissent. The overall lazy banks in the M&As do not create significantly positive externalities
for borrowers shareholders to free ride on.
We also contribute to the literature of M&As by focusing on the source of financing
in M&As. A related paper by Bharadwaj and Shivdasani (2003) examines bank financed
tender-offer acquisitions during 1990-1996. They find that bank financing adds value, and
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interpret this as the evidence that banks monitor and certify the deals. We attribute the
difference of our findings to several aspects as follows. First, they focus on tender-offer
acquisitions because they need to collect information about the financing source of the deals
from the required firm disclosures for such deals. Tender-offer acquisitions only account
for less than one sixth of all acquisitions recorded in SDC. We are able to circumvent this
data constraint in utilizing the comprehensive loan data from Dealscan, and we cover all
acquisitions in our sample. We find that bank financing does not add value if we extend
their sample to all acquisitions even during their sample period 1990-1996.
Second, the banking industry has been undergoing dramatic changes since the time pe-
riod of their sample (1990-1996), characterized by asset securitization and other financial
innovations. Wang and Xia (2011) find that lenders, who are more actively engaged in
securitization, exert less monitoring efforts to their portfolio loans. There have been also
significant changes in the competitive landscape on the syndicated loan market. In untab-
ulated analysis, we examine the syndicate structures of all deals reported in Dealscan over
our sampler period 1990-2009. We find an interesting inter-temporal change, echoing the
increase in credit supply: the decline in the share of loans taken by lead banks and accord-
ingly the increase in the share by participant banks in an average deal over time5. The
decline in the loan share, combined with securitization, might have attenuated lead banks
monitoring/screening incentives.
5The number of participant banks in a deal increases as well over time.
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3 Sample selection and variable construction
3.1 Sample construction
Our sample of acquisitions comes from the Securities Data Companys (SDC) U.S. Merges
and Acquisitions Database. We select domestic mergers and acquisitions with the announce-
ment date between January 1, 1990 and December 31, 2009. We consider only acquisitions
in which acquiring firms purchase all the shares of the acquired firm or subsidiary, and we
require the acquiring firm to control less than 50% of the shares of the target firm before the
announcement. We exclude financial firms (SIC code between 6000 and 6999) and utility
firms (SIC code between 4900 and 4949). We further require that (1) the deal value is greater
than US M&As $1million, (2) the deal value is at least 1% of the acquirers market value
of equity measured on the 11th trading day prior to the announcement date, (3) the target
firms is a public U.S. firm or a non-public subsidiary of a US public or US private firm,
and (4) the acquirer has annual financial statement information available from Compustat
and stock return data (210 trading days prior to acquisition announcements) from Center
for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). Finally, we restrict our sample of M&As to deals
paid for either partly or completely with cash, as we are comparing bank financed deals with
other cash deals. The final sample includes 2918 deals.
3.2 Definitions of key variables
We define a merger as being bank financed if the acquiring firm takes any loans from
one year prior to the merger announcement to the deal completion date. This is to take
in account the two possible scenarios: (i) firms may have secured bank financing before
announcing the deals, or (ii) may announce the deals before seeking for financing of the deal.
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Totally 563 deals are classified as being bank financed and the remainder are financed either
through bond issuances (431 deals) or by internal cash. We define bond financed acquisitions
similarly. Alternative definitions have also been used in identifying whether an acquisition
is bank financed, e.g., loans obtained from one year before the deal announcement to the
deal announcement date, or loans with the reported purpose in Dealscan being that they are
made to finance acquisitions. Our results are not sensitive to these alternative definitions.
We measure the acquirers performance in several ways. One is the cumulative abnor-
mal returns (CARs) over the three-day event window (-1, +1), estimated using the market
model with the benchmark returns being the CRSP equally-weighted index returns. The
market model parameters are estimated over the 200-day period from event day -210 to
event day -11, where event day 0 is the acquisition announcement date. The second mea-
sure is the three-year buy-and-hold abnormal stock returns (BHARs) subsequent to the deal
announcement. We follow Lyon et al. (1999) and estimate the BHARs relative to control
firms matched on size, book-to-market, and prior six-month returns. Our last measure ex-
amines the change in the average operating performance (ROA) from the three years prior
to the deal announcement to the three years after the announcement. The operating perfor-
mance (ROA) is measured as the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to total assets
(EBIT/assets). ROA could be affected by industry-wide factors. Therefore, we subtract the
median ROA of firms with the same primary two-digit SIC code.
For loan contract terms, we use the all-in-spread drawn variable from the LPC as the
yield spread measure of the loan. We define a dummy variable for collateral that takes the
value of 1 if the loan is classified as secured and 0 otherwise. We construct an index that
sums up all the covenants present in the loan, and we construct two sub-indices that sum
up the total number of financial and general covenants, respectively. Detailed definitions of
all variables used in this paper are in Appendix A.
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3.3 Summary statistics
Table 2 presents summary statistics of acquirers characteristics. Bank financed firms are
not significantly different from other firms in many dimensions, except that they have greater
asset tangibility, are more profitable, and have higher leverage ratios as well as more free
cash flows.
From table 3, we find that bank financed deals (hereinafter BF) are slightly larger than
non-bank financed deals (NBF). Moreover, consistent with the literature, the average cash
deal experiences significantly positive CARs around the deal announcement for both BF and
NBF, but the median BF CARs are not significant. NBF CARs are even higher than BF
ones, although the differences are not statistically significant. It suggests that the market
does not believe that banks endorse the deals despite providing financing for them. table
3 also presents the incidence of diversifying vs. non-diversifying deals. An acquisition is
defined to be diversifying if the bidder and the target do not share the identical 48 Fama-
French industries. This is particularly relevant as banks may prefer to fund acquisitions that
are less risky from their stand point of view. However, there is no significant difference in
the proportion of diversifying deals between BF and NBF (both are around 40%).
Table 4 shows the univariate comparison of loan contract terms (yield spread, maturity,
collateral, and covenant). In Panel A, the comparison is made between loans used to finance
acquisitions in our sample and all other loans in Dealscan. In Panel B, in order to control
for the impact of the borrower fixed effect and the time effect on loan contract terms, we
contrast the acquisition-related loans to loans made to the same firm in the second year
prior to the deal announcement. Recall that we define loans made in the year prior to the
deal announcement as being acquisition related. Both panels yield similar results. That is,
acquisition-related loans have significantly more collaterals and covenants. The difference in
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loan maturity is mixed, but insignificant in either panel. The yield spread of acquisition-
related loans is lower, but the difference is only significant in Panel A.
4 Main analysis and findings
4.1 Bidder performance
The univariate evidence shows that the announcement CARs are not significantly differ-
ent between BF and NBF. We now conduct a multivariate regression of the announcement
CARs, controlling for other variables that have been shown to be significant in explaining
bidder returns. The key variable of interest, bank financing, is a dummy that equals one if a
deal is bank financed and zero otherwise. The control variables, motivated by prior studies,
include target ownership status, a dummy for diversifying acquisition, relative size of the
acquisition, as well as bidder characteristics like firm size, Tobins Q, book leverage ratio,
and profitability. In all regressions, we control for year and industry fixed effects and report
the standard errors clustered at the firm level.
Results are reported in table 5. From the baseline regressions on the full sample of M&As
in Panel A, we find that bank financing has no significant effect on the CARs, consistent
with the univariate evidence. The finding is unaffected when we control for a proxy for
information asymmetry of the bidder earnings residual. Following Moeller et al. (2007), it
is defined as the standard deviation of the three-day cumulative abnormal returns around
earnings announcements over the 5-year period preceding the acquisition announcement.
Furthermore, following Masulis et al. (2007), we also include GIM index and board inde-
pendence to control for the effect of internal governance on deal quality. Datta et al. (2001)
find a significantly positive relation between bidder managers equity-based compensation
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(EBC) and bidder announcement returns. Similar to Datta et al. (2001), we define EBC as
the percentage of equity-based compensation in a CEOs annual compensation package, with
equity-based pay being defined as the value of stock options and restricted stock grants. Our
finding is unaffected with these controls.
One might be concerned that deals financed with internal cash may not be a good bench-
mark for bank financed deals. In examining the role of banks, it is better to have an alter-
native external source of financing as a proper benchmark. We therefore focus on comparing
deals financed by banks vs. those by bond issuances. From the results reported in the last
column of Panel A, we find that banks are not adding more value than public financing.
In table 6, we complement the announcement returns with the other two performance
measures. Consistent with the results of the announcement returns, we do not find any
evidence of value addition from bank financing, regardless of whether the benchmark is all
non-bank financed deals or bond financed deals. For the rest of the analysis in the paper, we
find that the results on the other two measures mimic those on the announcement returns,
and thus we choose not to report them for brevity.
The evidence so far suggests that banks may not screen or monitor to the extent that
shareholders of the bidder will benefit from. We further examine the robustness of this
finding by focusing on several special circumstances, under which the scope for banks to
add value is greater. Basically, we interact the bank financing variable with the related
variables and see whether the interaction term has any incremental power in explaining the
firm performance.
First, we investigate whether reputable banks and banks having a prior relationship with
the bidders will add more value. More reputable banks may have greater incentives to
monitor due to their reputation concern, or they may have more expertise in monitoring.
Prior studies (e.g. Boot and Thakor, 1997; Berger and Udell, 1995; Boot, 2000) argue that
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relationship banks have more information about their borrowers, which can be used in more
efficient monitoring. We define a reputable bank dummy that equals one if a bank has a
market share greater than the sample median in the prior year.
Second, we posit that bank financing might be a more valuable certification device about
the deal quality for bidders that are financially constrained or more opaque (having a higher
degree of information asymmetry) to investors. These firms are also more bank dependent.
We proxy for these situations if firms are small, not rated or have below-investment ratings,
do not pay dividends.
Third, if banks monitor, they should have more incentives to do so when their interests are
better aligned with shareholders. Financial distress is such a circumstance, as loan payment
may be defaulted if firms continue to perform financially poorly. We define a distress dummy
that equals one if the Z-score is above the sample median and zero otherwise.
The results obtained from testing the above circumstances using the CARs as the perfor-
mance measure are shown in table 7. None of the interaction terms with the bank financing
variable are significant. This finding casts further doubt on the bank monitoring hypothesis.
Overall, our findings so far do not support the conflict of interest hypothesis either, as bank
financed deals are not fared worse as this hypothesis would suggest.
4.2 Loan contract term regression
We have shown that bank financing has no wealth effects on average. The question is
that, as a stakeholder, how may banks deal with the downside risks (credit defaults) if they
are not so concerned with the deal quality? We therefore test the lazy bank hypothesis to see
whether banks can protect themselves from such risks through more stringent loan contract
terms, and thus de facto effectively substitute efforts on monitoring. The univariate evidence
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in table 4 supports this conjecture. We conduct this test in the multivariate context.
We use several firm-specific characteristics to control for their impact on loan terms.
Larger, more profitable, and less leveraged firms are likely to borrow from banks on better
terms. Because lenders can recover tangible assets should a firm default, we expect firms
with more tangible assets to have better terms. Cash flow volatility is used to proxy for a
firm’s earnings risk and is expected to be positively correlated with the cost of debt. We
control for loan maturity in months in regressing the yield spread, because a lender requires
a liquidity premium for longer term debt and this liquidity premium translates into a higher
loan spread. We also include loan size, which captures economies of scale in bank lending
and thus is expected to be inversely related to the loan rate. Performance pricing is a dummy
variable that equals one if a loan contract has the performance pricing feature6. This is to
control for the possibility that lenders price loans differently if they contain performance
pricing clauses.
Macroeconomic conditions can affect debt pricing. We use three different variables to
control for macroeconomic cycles. Credit spread is the difference between the yields of BAA
and AAA corporate bonds. Term spread is the difference between the yields of 10 year
treasury bonds and 2 year treasury bonds. The literature suggests that credit spread and
term spread are good proxies of macroeconomic conditions and help explain stock and bond
returns (e.g. Chen et al., 1986; Fama and French, 1993). Specifically, credit spreads tend
to widen in recessions and to shrink in expansions (e.g. Collin-Dufresne et al., 2001). This
is because investors require more compensation for increased default risk in bad economic
times. High (low) term spreads are often used as an indicator of good (bad) economic
prospects. In the regressions, we measure credit spread and term spread one month before
6The performance pricing feature makes the loan interest rate step up in the event of adverse shocks to
the borrower’s credit risk. This feature has been shown to have a significant effect on the loan interest rate
(Asquith et. al., 2005).
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the time the loan becomes active.
Finally, we control for loan type, loan purpose, and industry effects. Because loans with
different types and purposes and in different industries are associated with different risks,
they may be evaluated differently. To ensure that our inference is not confounded by any
unobservable firm-specific factors, we employ a firm fixed-effect estimation in regressing the
loan contract terms.
Table 8 presents our regression analyses on the loan contract terms for all loans in
Dealscans. In untabulated results, we also conduct the same analysis on the sample of
loans that are made to sample firms in the second year prior to the M&A announcements as
well as loans used to finance the M&As, and the results are similar. We find that the banks
dont charge higher yield spreads for M&A loans, but protect themselves by imposing more
stringent requirements on other contract terms. Specifically, consistent with the univariate
evidence, acquisition loans are required to have significantly more collaterals and covenants.
We differentiate between financial and general covenants, and find that both increase for
acquisition loans. Also, we find that banks impose shorter maturities to acquisition loans
after controlling for other factors.
Most of the control variables yield a similar result to the literature (e.g. Graham et al.,
2008). Non-price terms of the loan contract are equally important in explaining the cross
section of loan spreads. The performance pricing dummy is negative and significant in ex-
plaining the variation in loan spreads. Interestingly, the negative (and significant) coefficient
for maturity and the positive (significant) coefficient for collateral are inconsistent with the
notion that these non-price terms can be used as trade-off features for price terms7.
7Paper such as Stulz and Johnson (1985) and others model the collateral decision as one where higher
quality borrowers signal their decision by pledging collateral. On the other hand, models of collateral based
on risk shifting have riskier borrowers pledging collateral. Empirically, several papers starting with Berger
and Udell (1990) and Jimnez et al. (2006) find that collateral has a positive impact on loan rate, more
consistent with the risk shifting model rather than the signaling models of collateral.
18
4.3 Interaction of banks and shareholders: Deal completion anal-
ysis
The evidence so far suggests that banks may substitute monitoring for stringent loan
contract terms, which is socially inefficient as banks could have used their information and
expertise in screening out deals that do not create value. It would be intriguing to see
how banks may respond when shareholders strongly disagree with the announced M&A as
a strong negative signal of the deal quality. Do banks listen to the market? How likely
may banks be subject to the pressure from shareholders? We do not observe the interaction
between banks and managers. So we exploit the deal completion/termination decision to see
whether banks are receptive to the negative signal. If so, a deal which is value destroying
for shareholders is more likely to be terminated if banks monitor under pressure to call off
the deal.
Specifically, we examine the impact of bank financing on the likelihood of deal completion.
If banks were monitoring under pressure, then bank financing should increase the likelihood of
terminating value-reducing acquisitions. We conduct a probit regression of deal completion,
where the dependent variable is a dummy that equals one if the announced deal is completed,
and 0 if it is terminated. We define, as one of the explanatory variables, a value-losing dummy
that equals one if the announcement CARs are negative, indicating the poor quality of the
deal and shareholder dissent on the deal news. This variable is then interacted with the
bank financing variable to examine the conjecture discussed above.
The regression results are present in table 9. We find that, unconditionally, bank financed
deals are more likely to be completed. However, conditional on a deal being announced with
negative stock response, bank financed deals are more likely to be terminated. This finding
suggests an interesting interaction between shareholders and creditors: banks sometimes are
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subject to the shareholder dissent, and may monitor under pressure.
In sum, we do not find that bank financing has positive wealth effect for acquirers share-
holders on average, implying the lack of evidence on bank monitoring. Banks seem to
substitute monitoring with long contract terms. Nevertheless, there is evidence that banks
may monitor to the interest of shareholders under the pressure from shareholders.
5 Robustness checks and discussions
5.1 Selection bias: Monitoring unobserved?
Banks might have screened or monitored, but it was unobserved. As such, our finding is
subject to a selection bias. For instance, banks could have communicated with management
privately and prevented firms, by refraining from financing the deals, from even embarking
on acquisitions that could result in large value destruction. If it were the case, however, it
should have biased against us finding that bank financed deals perform similarly to non-bank
financed deals, because we should expect that bank financed deals on average are better deals
as value-losing deals have been netted out.
5.2 Lack of superior performance due to low risks?
One may argue that M&As are such a corporate setting where interest conflict between
creditors and shareholders is likely severe. Being aware of this, banks may choose to fi-
nance only less risky (and mediocre) M&As, which can explain the lack of superior stock
performance. However, as table 3 shows, only about 40 percent of bank financed M&As are
diversifying deals, a proportion similar to that for non-bank financed M&As. Moreover, the
finding on the subsample of financially distressed firms in table 7 suggests that bank financed
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deals do not outperform even in the case where the interests of creditors and shareholders
are likely the most aligned.
5.3 Stringent contract terms reflect higher credit risks?
If banks do not specifically avert financing risky deals as shown above, one might be
concerned that the more stringent loan contracts simply reflect higher credit risks that banks
embrace due to the risk-taking incentives by equity holders. To address this issue, we follow
Acharya et al. (2007) and gauge the acquiring firms post-acquisition credit risks by estimating
the firms distress probability in the three years subsequent to the deals. We then run a
regression of this distress probability on the bank financing variable to see whether bank
financed deals are more likely to observe a credit event during the examined period.
The results are shown in table 10. We find that the likelihood of distress is not signif-
icantly higher for bank financed firms in every of the post-acquisition three years or in the
overall three-year period. Therefore, the stringent contract terms are not likely to be due to
higher credit risks associated with the financed deals.
5.4 Endogeneity of bank financing
The choice of bank financing is not exogenous. There may be a common unobserved factor
that drives both the bank financing decision and the announcement abnormal returns. We
instrument the choice of bank financing and re-examine its wealth effect using the Heckman
two-stage method. We use three instrumental variables which we justify economically. The
first is the average geographical distance between the acquirers and all banks in the region
of the acquirers headquarter. A firm is expected to be more likely to obtain bank financing
when it is located closer to banks, but its location should not affect investors response to its
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acquisition announcement. The second is whether a M&A is made during the credit bubble
period 2005-2007. A firm is more likely to get financing from banks due to the greater
availability of cheap capital during the credit bubble period. Lastly, the third instrument is
whether the acquirer has borrowing experience with banks. It is intuitive that the firm will
have better access to new loans with its prior experience. Table 11 presents the results of
the treatment effect regressions for the CAR. These three IVs yield similar results that the
first stage F-statistics are all larger than 10 and reject the null that the coefficient on the
instruments are insignificantly different from 0 at the 1% level. More importantly, the second
step estimation all have consistent results that bank financing does not add value. Overall,
the two-step regression finding is consistent with that obtained from the OLS regression.
6 Conclusion
We examine the impact of bank financing on bidder value in M&A. In contrast with the
conventional theoretical argument, we fail to find that banks screen or monitor firms ac-
quisition decisions, to the extent that shareholders of acquirers can benefit. Instead, banks
impose more stringent loan contract terms in financing the acquisitions. Our findings are
more consistent with the theoretical arguments in Seward (1990) and Besanko and Kanatas
(1993) who argue that bank monitoring incentives differ significantly from monitoring in-
centives of shareholders, and Manove et al. (2001) who argue that banks may substitute
monitoring by tightening up loan contract terms. We believe our results highlight an im-
portant limitation of evaluating the benefits of bank lending using stock price data. Further
research would examine the circumstances under which bank financing would add value for
shareholders and where it does not add value.
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Table 1: Empirical prediction of three hypotheses
This table summarizes the empirical prediction of the three hypotheses tested in this paper. +
denotes the hypothesis predict a positive effect on the variable. - denotes the hypothesis predict a
negative effect on the variable. 0 denotes the hypothesis predict a no effect on the variable. N.A.
denotes the hypothesis has no prediction on the variable.
Hypothesis CAR Loan
Fee
Maturity Collateral Covenant
Screening/Monitoring Hypothesis + N.A N.A N.A N.A
Lazy bank Hypothesis 0 N.A - + +
Conflict of interest Hypothesis 0 + - + +
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Table 2: Summary statistics:Acquirers characteristics
The sample consists of M&A using non-zero cash announced during the period January 1, 1990-
December 31, 2009. The bidders are listed in the Securities Data Companys Mergers and Acqui-
sitions database and have trading data in CRSP and annual financial report data in Compustat.
Bank-financed is a dummy variable equal 1 for there is at least one loan issued during (-12 month,
deal completion) M&A event window and 0 otherwise. Leverage is the ratio of book value debt to
market value of equity. Total asset is the book value of the asset. Tobins q is the bidders market
value divided by the book value of asset. FCF is the Operating income before depreciation minus
interest expenses, income taxes, and capital expenditures, scaled by book value of total assets.
Managerial ownership is Bidder managers’ percentage ownership of the firm, including both stock
and stock options. Independent board is a dummy variable equaling 1 if over 50% of bidder di-
rectors are independent. G-index is number of antitakeover provisions. Profitability is the ratio
of EBITDA to sales. Tangibility is the ratio of NPPE to total assets. Current ratio is the ratio
of current assets to current liabilities. Market-to-book is the ratio of (book value of assets minus
book value of equity plus market value of equity) to the book value of assets. See Appendix A for
a detailed definition of all variables. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *,
**, and ***, respectively.
Mean Std. No.
Obs.
Non-
bank-
financed
(Mean)
bank-
financed
(Mean)
Mean
Diff.
Total assets($ million) 6861 21648 2709 7024 6185 839.5
Tangibility 0.25 0.22 2706 0.24 0.28 -0.04***
Profitability 0.13 0.12 2709 0.12 0.16 -0.04***
Book to market Ratio 0.47 0.36 2709 0.48 0.45 0.03
Leverage 0.40 0.19 2709 0.40 0.43 -0.03***
Free Cash Flow 0.04 0.12 2709 0.04 0.06 -0.03***
Independent board 0.30 0.46 2709 0.28 0.37 -0.09***
Zscore (modified) 6.31 8.36 2709 6.56 5.26 1.30**
Current ratio 2.75 2.62 2614 2.90 2.14 0.76***
Asset maturity 7.49 7.07 2599 7.48 7.51 -0.03
GIM index 9.15 2.63 1407 9.19 9.03 0.16
No. of directors 9.20 2.76 1015 9.24 9.08 0.16
Managerial Ownership(%) 0.003% 0.01% 1459 0.003% 0.003% 0.000
28
Table 3: Summary statistics: deal characteristics
CAR is the abnormal return of the acquiring firm in a time window from -1 to +1 day relative to
the announcement date of the merger. Relative Deal Size is the deal size divided by the total asset.
Diversifying Deal equal to 1 if the merger does not have same FamaFrench 48 industry code. Diff.
is the mean difference between the bank financed deal and non-bank financed deal. Significance at
the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively.
Bank-financed
0 1 Diff.
CAR(mean) 0.007*** 0.006** 0.001
CAR(median) 0.0035*** 0.0027 0.0008
Relative Deal Size(mean) 0.362 0.458 -0.09***
Relative Deal Size(median) 0.13 0.18 -0.05
Diversifying Deal
0 1308 315
1 875 211
Target Type
Joint Venture 21 2
Private 816 175
Public 1098 289
Subsidiary 248 60
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Table 4: Summary statistics: loan characteristics
Loan spread is measured as all-in spread drawn in the Dealscan database. Collateral is a dummy
variable that equals one if the loan facility is secured by collateral and zero otherwise. Maturity is
debt maturity measured in months. Number of Covenants is the total number of covenants included
in the debt agreement. Number of General (Financial) Covenants is the total number of general
(financial) covenants in the debt agreement. Panel A compare the M&A loan and non-M&A loans.
Panel B compare the M&A loans with loan issued to the same borrower but in the second year
prior to the deal announcement. Mean Diff. is the mean difference between the M&A loans and
non-M&A loans. A detailed definition of all variables is reported in Appendix A. Significance at
the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively.
Panel A
Overall sample Non M&A
loan
M&A loan Mean Diff.
Loan Spread 192.2 194.4 163.4 31.07***
Collateral 0.249 0.242 0.389 -0.147***
Maturity in months 47.24 47.29 46.24 1.055
Number of Financial Covenants 0.185 0.173 0.416 -0.243***
Number of General Covenants 1.059 0.978 2.743 -1.765***
Total number of covenants 1.244 1.152 3.159 -2.008***
N 33906 32909 997
Panel B
Loan made in the
second year prior
to the M&A
announcement
date and issued to
same borrower
M&A loan Mean Diff.
Loan Spread 174.3 171.6 2.738
Collateral 0.318 0.417 -0.0991***
Maturity in months 43.64 44.55 -0.903
Number of Financial Covenants 0.329 0.444 -0.115*
Number of General Covenants 1.814 2.801 -0.987***
Total number of covenants 2.143 3.245 -1.101***
N 1697 997
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Table 5: Effect of bank-financing on acquirers performance—CAR
The dependent variable in all specifications is the abnormal return of the acquiring firm in a time
window from -1 to +1 day relative to the announcement date of the merger. A bank financed
merger is a merger paid for partly or completely by cash, and the acquiring firm took a loan from
the LPC database during (-1yr, completion) M&A window. Bond-financed deal is defined as there
is any bond issued during (-1yr, completion) cash M&A window. BHAR is the 3-year buy-and
hold abnormal returns. ∆ROA is the changes in the industry-adjusted three year average ROA. A
detailed definition of all variables is reported in Appendix A. All models have year, and industry
fixed effects that are not reported in the table. Standard errors are all clustered at firm level and
reported in parentheses. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***,
respectively.
Basic
specification
Control Asy.
Info. Measure
Control CG
measure
Bank- vs
Bond-financed
Bank financed 0.0027 -0.00034 0.00037 0.0064
(0.0041) (0.0046) (0.0051) (0.0059)
Deal size 0.0042 0.0023 -0.020** -0.0034
(0.0034) (0.0049) (0.0096) (0.0051)
Target is Private 0.018*** 0.022*** 0.014** 0.025***
(0.0040) (0.0044) (0.0053) (0.0071)
Target is a Subsidiary 0.023*** 0.024*** 0.015** 0.0062
(0.0051) (0.0062) (0.0069) (0.0084)
Tender Offer 0.0070* 0.0084* 0.0043 -0.00059
(0.0039) (0.0044) (0.0050) (0.0064)
Diversifying merger 0.0015 0.00013 -0.0024 -0.0049
(0.0032) (0.0038) (0.0044) (0.0057)
Log (Market Cap) -0.0036*** -0.0034*** -0.0034** -0.0035**
(0.0010) (0.0013) (0.0017) (0.0018)
Tobins q -0.000071 -0.00027 0.00054 0.00075
(0.0012) (0.0015) (0.0017) (0.0021)
Leverage 0.0019 0.0022 0.011 0.014
(0.0100) (0.012) (0.015) (0.018)
Free Cash Flow -0.011 0.016 0.051 0.023
(0.019) (0.028) (0.031) (0.036)
Earnings residual -0.11* -0.034
(0.064) (0.088)
Independent Board -0.0015
(0.0052)
GIM index -0.00077
(0.00073)
Managerial ownership 20.4
(14.6)
Constant 0.091*** 0.073*** 0.076* 0.011
(0.028) (0.026) (0.045) (0.032)
Number of observations 2709 1652 1052 994
adj. R-sq 0.047 0.064 0.035 0.082
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Table 6: Effect of bank-financing on acquirers performance—long term
BHAR is the 3-year buy-and hold abnormal returns. ∆ROA is the changes in the industry-adjusted
three year average ROA. A bank financed merger is a merger paid for partly or completely by cash,
and the acquiring firm took a loan from the LPC database during (-1yr, completion) M&A window.
Bond-financed deal is defined as there is any bond issued during (-1yr, completion) cash M&A
window.A detailed definition of all variables is reported in Appendix A. All models have year, and
industry fixed effects that are not reported in the table. Standard errors are all clustered at firm
level and reported in parentheses. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **,
and ***, respectively.
BHAR Full
sample
∆ROA Full
sample
BHAR Bank-
vs. Bond-
financed
∆ROA Bank-
vs. Bond-
financed
Bank financed 0.021 -0.0059 0.043 -0.011
(0.057) (0.0052) (0.080) (0.0068)
Deal size 0.033 0.0035 -0.042 0.0028
(0.044) (0.0033) (0.076) (0.0060)
Target is Private -0.087 0.00065 -0.10 0.000034
(0.062) (0.0058) (0.095) (0.0079)
Target is a Subsidiary -0.058 0.0048 -0.033 0.0042
(0.083) (0.0069) (0.14) (0.011)
Tender Offer 0.0064 0.00080 -0.067 -0.0040
(0.068) (0.0055) (0.095) (0.0080)
Diversifying merger -0.048 0.000029 0.054 0.0052
(0.050) (0.0044) (0.078) (0.0062)
Log (Market Capitalization) 0.0041 0.0011 -0.0049 -0.0014
(0.017) (0.0016) (0.027) (0.0023)
Tobins q -0.0025 -0.0019 -0.023 -0.0011
(0.020) (0.0026) (0.030) (0.0044)
Leverage 0.21 0.065*** 0.53** 0.052***
(0.15) (0.014) (0.24) (0.020)
Free Cash Flow 0.60** -0.21*** 0.69 -0.098
(0.26) (0.034) (0.55) (0.061)
Earnings residual -0.64 -0.083*** -0.29 -0.064*
(0.42) (0.025) (0.53) (0.038)
Number of observations 2709 1652 1052 994
adj. R-sq 0.047 0.064 0.035 0.082
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Table 7: Subsample analysis of acquiring firm abnormal return
The dependent variable in all specifications is the abnormal return of the acquiring firm in a time
window from -1 to +1 day relative to the announcement date of the merger. A Bank financed
merger is a merger paid for partly or completely by cash, and the acquiring firm took a loan from
the LPC database during (-1yr, completion) M&A window. A detailed definition of all variables is
reported in Appendix A. All models have year and industry fixed effects that are not reported in
the table. Standard errors are all clustered at firm level and reported in parentheses. Other control
variables in table 4 are also used in the empirical estimation but not reported to conserve space.
Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively.
CAR CAR CAR CAR CAR CAR CAR
Bank-financed 0.013 0.0026 0.0024 -0.0013 0.0026 0.0045 0.0025
(0.0083) (0.0044) (0.0049) (0.0050) (0.0045) (0.0060) (0.0042)
Bank Financed * -0.015*
Reputable bank (0.0088)
Bank Financed * 0.0013
Relationship Bank (0.0089)
No rating 0.0011
(0.0043)
Bank financed * No Rating 0.00074
(0.0079)
Not investment grade -
0.010**
(0.0044)
Bank financed * 0.0058
Not Investment Grade (0.0072)
Small Firm 0.0044
(0.0050)
Bank financed * 0.00037
Small (0.0089)
Dividend payer 0.0076**
(0.0038)
Bank financed * -0.0051
Dividend payer (0.0078)
Distress 0.018
(0.023)
Bank Financed * 0.020
Distress (0.052)
N 2709 2709 2709 2709 2709 2709 2408
adj. R-sq 0.048 0.047 0.047 0.048 0.047 0.048 0.045
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Table 8: Differences of M&A loans from other loans in loan contract terms
The dependent variable in each regression is reported at the top of the column. A detailed definition
of all variables is reported in Appendix A. All models have firm, year, industry, loan type and loan
purpose fixed effects that are not reported in the table. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level
is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively.
Loan
Spread
Collateral Log (ma-
turity)
Financial
Covenants
General
Covenants
All
covenants
M&A loan 0.024 0.72*** -0.065** 0.28** 0.089*** 0.11***
(0.023) (0.18) (0.026) (0.12) (0.034) (0.032)
Tangibility -0.059 -0.35 -0.039 1.34*** 0.028 0.11
(0.10) (0.72) (0.11) (0.51) (0.16) (0.15)
Profitability -0.25 3.40* 0.31 -3.57*** 0.035 -0.18
(0.27) (1.96) (0.27) (1.37) (0.43) (0.39)
Coverage -0.10*** -0.69*** -0.011 0.17 -0.070 -0.037
(0.031) (0.23) (0.031) (0.17) (0.049) (0.045)
Current Ratio -0.0075 0.052 0.015* 0.013 -0.0021 -0.0017
(0.0073) (0.050) (0.0080) (0.050) (0.010) (0.0099)
Collateral 0.23*** 0.050*** 1.05*** 0.91*** 0.91***
(0.018) (0.017) (0.081) (0.028) (0.026)
Log(asset) -0.034 -0.092 0.020 -0.24 0.060 0.020
(0.036) (0.26) (0.036) (0.19) (0.057) (0.052)
Book to Market 0.15*** 0.48*** -0.021 -0.49*** 0.0035 -0.031
(0.020) (0.13) (0.020) (0.087) (0.028) (0.026)
Leverage 0.64*** 1.35*** 0.019 0.28 0.034 0.062
(0.068) (0.47) (0.073) (0.33) (0.10) (0.093)
Log(maturity) -0.066*** 0.22*** -0.096* -0.012 -0.020
(0.013) (0.085) (0.057) (0.022) (0.020)
Log(loan size) -0.052*** 0.074 0.039*** 0.014 0.057*** 0.045***
(0.0074) (0.052) (0.0075) (0.033) (0.013) (0.012)
Performance pricing -0.055*** 2.28*** 0.087*** 0.95*** 1.08*** 1.05***
(0.016) (0.12) (0.017) (0.076) (0.026) (0.024)
Relationship Bank -0.0097 0.21** -0.031** 0.17*** 0.072*** 0.070***
(0.013) (0.10) (0.015) (0.064) (0.022) (0.020)
Credit spread 0.17*** 0.30 -0.078* 0.10 0.14** 0.16***
(0.042) (0.32) (0.042) (0.13) (0.065) (0.056)
Term spread 0.044* 0.40** -0.028 0.25 -0.0099 -0.0090
(0.024) (0.18) (0.025) (0.19) (0.038) (0.036)
Constant 6.15*** 3.90***
(0.23) (0.36)
Adjust/pseudo R2 0.056 0.341 0.271
N 5884 4609 8229 3853 6122 6216
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Table 9: Likelihood of deal completion
The dependent variable is the deal completion dummy. A detailed definition of all variables is
reported in Appendix A. All models have year and industry fixed effects that are not reported in
the table. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively.
Completion
Dummy
Completion
Dummy
Completion
Dummy
Bank financed 0.22* 0.22* 0.56***
(0.11) (0.11) (0.19)
Value losing -0.15* -0.066
(0.083) (0.09)
Bank financed* value losing -0.501***
(0.24)
Deal size -0.14*** -0.14*** -0.13**
(0.051) (0.051) (0.051)
Target is private 1.16*** 1.14*** 1.16***
(0.12) (0.12) (0.13)
Target is a subsidiary 0.88*** 0.87*** 0.88***
(0.16) (0.16) (0.16)
Log (market capitalization) 0.090*** 0.095*** 0.099***
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
Tobins q -0.0092 -0.01 -0.012
(0.032) (0.032) (0.032)
Leverage 0.13 0.13 0.13
(0.24) (0.24) (0.24)
Free Cash flow 0.34 0.3 0.28
(0.37) (0.37) (0.37)
Tender offer 0.18* 0.18* 0.19*
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
Constant -0.56 -0.57 -0.63
(0.55) (0.55) (0.55)
N 2579 2579 2579
Pseudo-R2 0.199 0.201 0.205
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Table 10: Prediction of distress after M&A
The dependent variable is the distress dummy. A detailed definition of all variables is reported in
Appendix A. All models have year and industry fixed effects that are not reported in the table.
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated
by *, **, and ***, respectively.
Distress in first
year after M&A
Distress in
second Year
after M&A
Distress in
third year after
M&A
Distress in
three years
after M&A
Bank Financed 0.24 0.084 -0.044 -0.045
(0.43) (0.30) (0.35) (0.23)
Deal size 0.48** 0.33** 0.19 0.34***
(0.20) (0.16) (0.16) (0.12)
Target is private 0.52 0.81** -0.86** 0.012
(0.49) (0.35) (0.37) (0.25)
Target is a subsidiary 0.39 0.013 -0.57 -0.18
(0.59) (0.49) (0.45) (0.32)
Tender offer 0.65 0.88** -0.15 0.28
(0.55) (0.39) (0.37) (0.28)
Diversifying Merger 0.30 -0.16 0.41 0.13
(0.40) (0.28) (0.29) (0.21)
Log (Market Cap) -0.72*** -0.45*** -0.56*** -0.60***
(0.20) (0.17) (0.19) (0.13)
Tobins q 0.87*** 0.30* 0.45** 0.58***
(0.23) (0.17) (0.18) (0.14)
Leverage -1.70 0.44 1.49 -0.098
(1.43) (0.94) (1.08) (0.75)
Tangibility -2.43** 0.50 0.056 -0.19
(1.17) (0.77) (0.85) (0.61)
Profitability -2.22 -0.82 -2.04 -1.51
(3.77) (2.50) (2.70) (1.92)
Coverage 0.46** 0.062 0.25 0.28**
(0.19) (0.15) (0.17) (0.12)
Current Ratio 0.040 -0.050 0.030 0.027
(0.092) (0.10) (0.085) (0.058)
Z-score -0.40*** -0.085 -0.063 -0.14***
(0.13) (0.060) (0.062) (0.048)
Free Cash Flow -4.79* -2.23 -0.077 -3.47**
(2.89) (2.09) (2.45) (1.59)
Constant 5.18* 2.41 2.91 2.03
(3.01) (2.25) (2.45) (1.97)
N 1222 1518 1003 1738
Adjust/pseudo R2 0.336 0.242 0.192 0.231
36
Table 11: Endogeneity of Bank Financing–Heckman Treatment Effect Model
IV rel 5 is defined as 1 if the deal gets funding at least partially from relationship bank. IV bubble
is defined as 1 if the loan is issued between years 2005 and 2007. ln(mean distance) is defined as the
log of mean difference between the firm and all the banks in LPC dataset. A detailed definition of
all variables is reported in Appendix A. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Significance
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively.
CAR Bank
financed
CAR Bank
financed
CAR Bank
financed
Bank financed 0.0065 -0.023 0.021
(0.0080) (0.031) (0.031)
IV rel 5 1.62***
(0.083)
IV bubble 0.83***
(0.20)
ln(mean distance) -0.85**
(0.43)
Deal size 0.0041* 0.14*** 0.0052** 0.14*** 0.0056* 0.17***
(0.0023) (0.048) (0.0026) (0.044) (0.0032) (0.055)
Target is private 0.018*** -0.050 0.018*** -0.0094 0.018*** -0.067
(0.0038) (0.087) (0.0038) (0.080) (0.0041) (0.085)
Target is a subsidiary 0.023*** -0.016 0.024*** 0.066 0.024*** 0.0095
(0.0051) (0.12) (0.0052) (0.11) (0.0055) (0.11)
Tender offer 0.0068 0.078 0.0079* 0.15* 0.0080* 0.042
(0.0042) (0.095) (0.0044) (0.087) (0.0048) (0.098)
Diversifying Merger 0.0015 -0.0085 0.0016 -0.019 0.0014 -0.017
(0.0031) (0.071) (0.0031) (0.066) (0.0034) (0.071)
Log (mcap) -0.004*** -0.006 -0.003*** 0.02 -0.004*** -0.001
(0.00095) (0.022) (0.00097) (0.020) (0.0011) (0.022)
Tobins q -0.000082 0.036 -0.000 0.0032 0.00036 0.022
(0.0010) (0.024) (0.0010) (0.023) (0.0011) (0.025)
Leverage 0.0015 0.12 0.0047 0.45** 0.0031 0.40**
(0.0085) (0.19) (0.0092) (0.18) (0.0098) (0.19)
Free Cash Flow -0.012 1.36*** -0.0032 1.66*** -0.017 1.46***
(0.013) (0.37) (0.016) (0.35) (0.016) (0.36)
Constant 0.091*** -2.21*** 0.091*** -1.64*** 0.098*** 5.89
(0.023) (0.52) (0.023) (0.46) (0.024) (3.68)
Lambda -0.0027 0.015 -0.010
(0.0049) (0.018) (0.017)
N 2709 2709 2340
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A APPENDIX: Variable Definition
• Leverage:(Long Term Debt+Debt in Current Liabilities)/Total Assets= (data9+data34)/data6
• Log(Assets):Natural log of Total Assets=log(data6)
• Tangibility: Net Property, Plant and Equipment/Total assets=data8/data6
• Profitability: EBITDA/Total Assets=data13/data6
• Market to Book :(Market value of equity plus the book value of debt)/Total Assets=( data25*data199+data6-data60)/data6
• Modified Altmans (1968) Z-score:(1.2working capital + 1.4 retained earnings +3.3EBIT + 0.999Sales)/Total Assets
=(1.2data179 + 1.4data36 + 3.3data170 + 0.999data12)/data6
• Small firm:Dummy variable equal to one if the acquirer has a deflation total asset equal to or less than that of the
median of all firms in the sample.
• Earnings Residual : The standard deviation of all three-day cumulative abnormal returns around earnings l announce-
ments from I/B/E/S using the market model over the 5-year period preceding the acquisition announcement.
• Idiosyncratic Volatility:the standard deviation of the market-adjusted residuals of the daily stock returns measured
during the period starting from 205 to six days prior to the acquisition announcement.
• Free cash flow : Operating income before depreciation (item13) interest expenses (item15) income taxes (item16)
capital expenditures (item128), scaled by book value of total assets (item6).
• Market capitalization: Number of shares outstanding multiplied by the stock price at the 11th trading day prior to
announcement date.
• Managerial equity ownership: Bidder managers’ percentage ownership of the firm, including both stock and stock
options.
• Board size: Number of directors on bidders board.
• Independent board : Dummy variable: 1 if over 50% of bidder directors are independent, 0 otherwise.
• GIM index : Taken from GIM (2003), based on 24 antitakeover provisions. Higher index levels correspond to more
managerial power.
• Distress: It is defined by the default probability estimated using Black-Scholes-Merton option pricing model. For each
month the default probability is estimated and if in six or more months of a certain year the default probability is equal
to or higher than the 90th percentile, that year is defined as a distress year. At the end of this process, each rm year
when the rm has sufficient trading and accounting data available is either classified as distressed (Distress=1) or not
distressed (Distress=0).
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• ln(mean distance): The log of mean geography distance between the firm headquarter and all the banks in LPC dataset.
• Bank financed : Dummy variable: 1 for there is at least one loan issued during (-12 month, deal completion) M&A event
window.
• Public target : Dummy variable: 1 for public targets, 0 otherwise.
• Target is private: Dummy variable: 1 for private targets, 0 otherwise.
• Target is a subsidiary: Dummy variable: 1 for subsidiary targets, 0 otherwise.
• All-cash deal : Dummy variable: 1 for purely cash-financed deals, 0 otherwise.
• Diversifying merger : Dummy variable: 1 if bidder and target do not share a FamaFrench 48 industry, 0 otherwise.
• Relative deal size: Deal value (from SDC) over bidder market value of equity defined above.
• CAR(1,+1): Denotes the three-day cumulative abnormal return (in percent) measured using market model residuals.
• BHAR: Denotes the three-year buy-and-hold abnormal returns difference between sample firm returns and corresponding
contemporaneous control firm returns.
• ∆ROA: Denotes the the difference between post- and pre-merger industry-adjusted three-year average ROA.
• IV rel 5 : IV rel 5 is defined as 1 if the deal gets funding at least partially from relationship bank.
• IV bubble: IV bubble is defined as 1 if the loan is issued between years 2005 and 2007.
• M&A loan: Dummy variable: 1 for the loan is issued during (-12 month, deal completion) M&A event window.
• Loan Spread : Loan spread is measured as all-in spread drawn in the Dealscan database. All-in spread drawn is defined
as the amount the borrower pays in basis points over LIBOR or LIBOR equivalent for each dollar drawn down. (For
loans not based on LIBOR, LPC converts the spread into LIBOR terms by adding or subtracting a differential which
is adjusted periodically.) This measure adds the borrowing spread of the loan over LIBOR with any annual fee paid to
the bank group.
• Log(Maturity) : Natural log of the loan maturity. Maturity is measured in months.
• Log(Loan Size) : Natural log of the loan facility amount. Loan amount is measured in millions of dollars.
• Collateral dummy : A dummy variable that equals one if the loan facility is secured by collateral and zero otherwise.
• Covenant : Number of Covenants is the total number of covenants included in the debt agreement. Number of General
(Financial) Covenants is the total number of general (financial) covenants in the debt agreement
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• Log (Maturity): Natural logarithm of debt maturity measured in months.
• Performance Pricing dummy : A dummy variable that equals one if the loan facility uses performance pricing.
• Number of Lenders : Total number of lenders in a single loan.
• Loan Type Dummies : Dummy variable for loan types, including term loan, revolver greater than one year, revolver
less than one year, and 364 day facility.
• Loan Purpose Dummies : Dummy Variable for loan purposes, including corporate purposes, debt repayment, working
capital, etc.
• Credit Spread : The difference between BAA corporate bond yield and AAA corporate bond yield. (Data source:
Federal Reserve Board of Governors.)
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